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TRAFFIC JAM ON THE MUSIC HIGHWAY:
IS IT A REPRODUCTION OR A PERFORMANCE?
by MICHAEL A. EINHORN*
AND LEWIs KURLANTZICK**
I. INTRODUCTION
The American copyright system separately protects the sounds in mu-
sic recordings and the words and music of the underlying composition
upon which they are based; separate rights are defined for reproduction
and public performance of each work. Consequently, at least four distinct
rights are implicated in the use of any piece of recorded music in digital
audio.' Some of these complementary rights are under the exclusive con-
trol of one owner, while others can be regulated by or under the control of
an independent second owner. Moreover, different institutions perform
different administrative roles.2 This fragmentation of copyright yields du-
plicative regulation and negotiation, with a corresponding increase in the
costs of administration.
The consequences of fragmentation are disturbing in the digital age,
as digital technology produces a breakdown and conflation of legal catego-
ries that were meaningful in the analog era.3 By statutory standards, every
audio transmission on the Internet now involves making reproductions
*Principal, LECG, LLC, New York, NY (http://www.lecg.com); email:
meinhorn@lecg.com; (212)468-7845. The author is an economic expert specializing
in media, entertainment, and intellectual property. LECG is a firm of consulting
economists and testifying experts in seventeen cities on four continents that pro-
vides litigation support in a wide variety of areas. The views expressed herein do
not necessarily reflect the opinions of any other expert at LECG.
**Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. Wesleyan
University 1965; LL.B. Harvard University 1968; http://www.law.uconn.edu; e-
mail: lkurlant@law.uconn.edu; (860) 570-5248. I wish to thank Jeffrey Fritz for
able research assistance and Dean Nell Newton for generous summer research
support.
1 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the
Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 548, 565-66 (1997) (multiplicity of rights
violated by Internet radio service transmission of copyrighted song).
2 See generally Ruth Towse, Copyright and Economic Incentives: An Application
to Performers' Rights in the Music Industry, 52 KYKLOs 369, 372 (1999)
(copyrighted work distinct from an economic product, which may be made
up of different works owned initially by different agents).
3 See generally 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT §§ 8.21[B] (hybrid forms of exploitation), 8.24 (2001) ("the break-
down of categories"); Lemley, supra note 1, at 573-74 (Internet distinctive;
not only constitutes a new medium of communication but also one which
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and wired performances of both the recording and its underlying composi-
tion.4 Consequently, the same act can be viewed as a reproduction and
distribution of copies on the one hand and a public performance or display
of the work on the other.5 Since these rights are controlled by different
parties and agents, the complexity of the system leads to a gridlock of
control that may hinder development.
Moreover, there is a spectrum of user access between permanent re-
production and instantaneous performance that incorporates many inter-
mediate points.6 In this context, the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty7 and
blends the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and performance in
unanticipated ways; destabilization of traditional copyright regime).
4 See Dennis S. Karjala, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the Infor-
mation Age, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 527, 532-33 (2001) (book review) (in digital
world reproduction by itself not good indicator of activity that deprives cop-
yright owner of revenue).
5 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly? Essay Review of
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Prometheus Books 2001), 25 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 16-17), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so/3/papers.cfm?abstract id.=288240 (last visited
Feb. 25, 2002); Lemley, supra note 1, at 549-67. The idea of digital transmis-
sion obscures the boundaries between broadcasting and distribution of
sound recordings. The accepted terms of description (and prescription) of
standard modes of exploitation of music - reproduction and performance
- do not translate well to contemporary digital uses, which are more accu-
rately described in terms of a continuum marking extent of access. This
upheaval in terminology complicates policy analysis.
6 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works:
the Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in U.S. INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND POLICY (Hugh Hansen ed., 2000) (forth-
coming), available at http://www.papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=
222493 (last visited Nov. 5, 2001); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 128-29 (1999) (unbundling of rights; fine-grained
control of access); MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE 55-78 (1999) ("the
digital wallet and the copyright box: the coming arms race in trusted sys-
tems"). See also Andrew Christie, A Proposal for Simplifying United King-
dom Copyright Law, 23 Eur. INTELL. PROP. REV. 26 (2001) (technology
enables exploitation of subject matter in way that does not easily or at all
come within existing categories, resulting in need for change in approach to
categorization of subject matter and rights); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright
and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1632-33 (2001) (each apprehension of digital work may be act of "ac-
cess" without acquisition of stand-alone copy); Shira Perlmutter, Conver-
gence and the Future of Copyright, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 163, 164,
172-73 (2001). On the contested question of whether copyright contains an
"access-right," see Thomas P. Heide, Copyright in the EU and U.S.: What
"Access-Right"?, 48 J. COPYR. Soc'v 363 (2001).
7 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art. 8.
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the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty8 established "making
available rights" that cover the exclusive rights of writers, performers and
labels to make - or not make - musical works and recordings available
at a time and place selected interactively by an individual listener. Non-
interactive services are not included within the "making available" con-
cept but rather would be covered by rights to remuneration for broadcast-
ing and communication to the public. 9
The confluence of new technology and content has produced serious
conflicts among the actors in the digital music industry - composers, pub-
lishers, record companies, performing artists, Web site operators, and on-
line music retailers.10 Indeed, these conflicts extend to disputes within
groups" and fractious litigation between long-time allies.12 The clashes
are rooted in disagreements about a number of policy questions including
the proper scope of the exemption for ephemeral recordings, the desirable
definition of the limits of the performance and reproduction interests, the
number of licenses to be required of an Internet music distributor, and the
appropriate treatment of content loaded into a computer's random access
memory.1 3
8 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, art. 10, 14. Both treaties were adopted on December 20, 1996 at a
WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions. The United States signed the treaties on April 12, 1997,
and the Senate ratified them on October 21, 1998.
9 Id. art. 15.
10 See, e.g., Hearings on Internet Music Availability Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, The Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary
Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of R. Glaser, Chairman and CEO
Real Networks, Inc.) (music publishing issues most significant impediment
to subscription services; one of most tangled areas of copyright system; re-
quire one-stop shopping for digital delivery licenses); Matt Richtel, Web
Sites and Recording Labels at Impasse on Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999,
at C19; Jeffrey D. Neuberger & Susan Israel, Music Industry Acts in Concert
on Sound Samples, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 1998, at C17.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 87-88 (dispute between performing rights
societies, which represent composers and music publishers, and mechanical
rights organization, which represents composers and music publishers).
12 See Rodgers & Hammerstein Org. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9322,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16111 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2001) (songwriters' and
music publishers' infringement suit against Universal Records' Web site).
13 The answers given to these questions will, of course, have substantial economic
consequences for those involved in the online dissemination of digital music
and significant impact on the relative efficiency of the structure in which
they operate. A social concern is that the present framework of complex
rights of control may make it very difficult for Internet operators to make
music transmissions legally, even if their activities come within a copyright
compulsory license or exemption. In the remainder of this article we sug-
gest the policy considerations that should inform analysis of these questions.
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In addition to difficulties posed by statutory and judicial definition,
there is now no commonly accepted method for pricing related rights in a
consistent manner. Rate Courts for performing rights1 4 and arbitration
panels for mechanical rights1 5 now set rates in their respective domains
using historical methods and benchmarks that do not correspond. Collect-
ing societies make contending claims, cyber-developers are confounded by
the complexity of the rules, and songwriters and composers who create
music lack legal standing in administrative hearings.
This article brings economic analysis to bear on the topic. The pri-
mary concern for any economic analysis is market performance, as mani-
fested in allocative efficiency, transactions costs, and technological
progress. First, economically efficient licensing should ensure that copy-
right administration favors no one delivery method over another. As a
practical matter, the relative price ratio between two substitute technolo-
gies for delivering music should not be distorted by the presence of asym-
metric copyright charges. Second, transaction costs can be reasonably
economized by "one-stop shopping" and reduced administration. Since
multilateral negotiations and administrative hearings are expensive, the
system should convey necessary usage rights through a minimum of trans-
actions. Third, the copyright process and the resulting license costs are
among the costs imposed upon new businesses in digital markets. This
article will advocate a number of reforms for streamlining the American
copyright system to protect the people who create music, the marketers
who promote it, and the consumers who buy it.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF MUSIC COPYRIGHT
Copyright in musical compositions and sound recordings is now se-
cured by the Copyright Act of 1976, the principal provisions of which be-
came effective on January 1, 1978.16 The use of recorded music implicates
two separate copyrights - the music and lyrics of the underlying composi-
tion and the sound recording of the performance of the composition. For
example, when Madonna recorded Don McLean's American Pie, the re-
14 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade
Cas. (CCH), J 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Com-
posers, Authors & Publishers, 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 73, 474 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (Second Amended Final Judgment); United States v. Broad. Music
Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Under the proce-
dure outlined in the consent decree that establishes judicial supervision
over ASCAP's prices, ASCAP has the burden of proving to the federal dis-
trict court the reasonableness of its proposed fee. The term "Rate Court"
in the text refers to this district court.
15 See infra note 24.
16 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
420
cord label owned rights in the sound recording, while McLean owned
rights in the song.17
The owner of the copyright in the musical composition, generally the
music publisher, controls the assignment of rights in the work. It has the
right to license mechanical reproduction/distribution and public perform-
ance of the words and music. The owner of copyright in the sound record-
ing, generally the record label, controls similar (but not identical) rights in
the record imprint; it has a corresponding right to reproduce and a limited
right to perform sounds captured in the recording. The owner of each
copyright is compensated through different legal arrangements, which may
involve yet more agents and administrative bodies.' 8
Musical Compositions
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants four exclusive rights to com-
posers who create tangible copies of original musical compositions.19
These rights include:
a. The right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
b. The right to prepare derivative works based on the copy-
righted work;
c. The right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending, and;
d. The right to perform the copyrighted work publicly.
The right to reproduce copyrighted musical compositions on tapes or
discs, as well as the additional right to distribute copies to the public, is
17 Similarly, when George Harrison composed the song Here Comes The Sun, he
authored a musical work protectible by copyright law. In contrast, a sound
recording is a fixation of a performance of an artist playing and singing a
musical composition. Thus, when The Beatles went into the studio to per-
form Here Comes The Sun, the recording of that session produced a sound
recording.
18 The exclusive rights to reproduce and to publicly perform copyrighted works
are the rights which bear centrally on Internet music transmissions. Clearly,
the transmission of recorded musical performances over the Internet in-
volves sending both the sound recording and the musical work embodied in
that recording. Since American law affords different rights and limitations
to musical works and sound recordings, the complexity of the copyright im-
plications of such transmissions rises, particularly when rights in the works
are owned or administered by different parties. This intricate structure pro-
duces serious legal and administrative difficulties which demand attention.
19 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
Traffic Jam on the Music Highway 421
Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
commonly called the mechanical right.20 The publisher has exclusive au-
thority to license first-time reproductions of all songs in its catalog. Sec-
ond uses are subject to compulsory licenses.
Mechanical royalties for the use of compositions on physical CDs are
generally collected from record labels by mechanical rights organizations
(MROs), most prominently the Harry Fox Agency (HFA). 2 1 Royalties are
based on the number of physical imprints made of the work. After de-
ducting a small percent for administrative expenses, the MROs return col-
lected moneys to publishers, who are responsible for paying writers their
contracted share. Writer-publisher shares can be bilaterally negotiated
and are open to competition;2 2 particularly successful writers may become
their own publishers.
Once authorized phonorecordS23 of a composition are publicly dis-
tributed, subsequent performers may record the same work subject to
compulsory (or statutory) licenses, established by section 115 of the Copy-
right Act.24 Under statutory licensing, performing artists may record new
renditions of previously recorded compositions at administratively-pre-
scribed "fair" fees25 without the need to secure express permission from
20 The terms "mechanical right" and "mechanical license" are historically derived
from the time when records were mechanically and not electronically repro-
duced. The right to license the reproduction of music on television, video,
and motion picture soundtracks is the synchronization right. In addition,
the copyright owner has the right to make derivations based on his work.
21 HFA is the music publishing industry's principal clearinghouse for the adminis-
tration of mechanical rights licenses. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON
Music LICENSING 670-71 (2d ed. 1996).
22 That is, independent publishers may compete for new writers by offering high
royalty shares.
23 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000): "'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds
... are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which
the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 'pho-
norecords' includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed."
24 Id. § 115. Section 115 creates an exception to both the reproduction and distri-
bution rights by granting third parties a nonexclusive license to make and
distribute phonorecords of nondramatic musical works.
If arbitrated, rates are established by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel. Com-
pulsory licensing enables secondary users to access works without negotia-
tion, reducing transaction costs. This license requires compliance with
certain procedural requirements and payment of a fee established by the
Copyright Office. Because the arrangement is more efficient, record com-
panies, in practice, obtain mechanical form licenses for cover recordings
from the Fox Agency, licenses which are derived from the statutory compul-
sory license, rather than rely on the provisions of § 115.
25 At the time of enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, section 115 set the
statutory fee at 2.75 cents per record and provided for periodic adjustment
of this prescribed royalty amount in a public proceeding. At present, the
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the music publisher.26 Compulsory licensing confers a reproduction and
distribution privilege only in the musical composition, not in the sound
recording as well. 2 7
Section 106 also empowers the copyright owner to receive compensa-
tion for a work performed in a public forum or medium. Under § 101, to
"perform" a musical composition (outside of audiovisual applications) is
to "recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any
device or process." 28 To perform a work "publicly" means:
(1) to perform ... it at a place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle
of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at dif-
ferent times.2 9
Clearly, the second part of this definition is more significant for In-
ternet transmissions, where streaming, and even downloading,3 0 to one lis-
tener in a private home may now constitute a public performance.
The respective domains of mechanical and performance rights now
appear to overlap as the same transmission can be classified as both a
public performance and a mechanical reproduction.31 Performing rights
mechanical royalty fee under the compulsory license is the larger of 8 cents
or 1.55 cents per minute. Increases are scheduled for 2002, 2004, and 2006.
37 C.F.R. § 255.3(k) (2002).
26 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 108-10 (2001) (exam-
ples of striking balance between compensation and control). Resort to the
compulsory licensing device is often grounded in a concern about transac-
tion costs. The fear is that when transaction costs are high, an otherwise
desirable exchange may not occur. A compulsory license, and fair transfer
price reflecting the value of the protected work, can presumably be used to
facilitate an outcome that is socially productive when positive transaction
costs block an efficient exchange. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTAND-
ING COPYRIGHT LAW 288-89 (3d ed. 1999).
27 Thus, for example, if one wished to duplicate and sell compact discs of The
Beatles' recording of Here Comes The Sun, one would have to negotiate
permission from the copyright proprietor of the sound recording, and he
would be free to refuse permission or to charge any fee he saw apt for that
permission.
28 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
29 Id.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 67-84.
31 See generally Lemley, supra note 1, at 573-74 (Internet distinctive; not only
constitutes a new medium of communication but also one which blends the
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advocates claim all transmitted compositions are public performances and
therefore entitle them to compensation. Simultaneously, mechanical
rights advocates claim that all transmitted compositions necessarily in-
volve incidental reproductions that are subject to their control. With both
groups claiming due copyright payment for the same transmissions, one
copyright authority (and music service provider) famously termed the out-
come an example of "double dipping." 32
III. SOUND RECORDINGS
The Copyright Act extends copyright protection to sound recordings,
as distinct from the underlying compositions.3 3 However, that protection,
as originally enacted, was limited to the exclusive rights of reproduction
and distribution. A public performance right was not granted to the pro-
prietors of sound recordings. Accordingly, stations that played recorded
music paid copyright royalties to writers and publishers of musical compo-
sitions, but not to the artists and labels that produced the record. 34 For
several decades, record labels unsuccessfully petitioned Congress to grant
a public performance right in sound recordings comparable to that for mu-
sical works. 35
In 1995, record companies secured some performance right protection
with respect to digital audio transmission36 with the passage of the The
Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPR-
exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and performance in unantici-
pated ways).
32 Bob Kohn, A Primer on the Law of Webcasting and Digital Music Delivery,
Er. L. REP., Sept. 1998, at 4, 9, 11, 12. For review and analysis of the legal
issue, see Karajala, supra note 4, at 533 n.24; R. Anthony Reese, The Public
Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the Controversy
over RAM "Copies", 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 138-46. See also Lemley,
supra note 1, at 579 (little case support and no policy reason for applying
two different exclusive rights to the same act).
33 The Copyright Act defines "sound recording" as a work that results "from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds ... regardless of the
nature of the material subjects, such as disks, tapes, or other phono records,
in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C § 101 (2000).
34 Presumably, broadcast performances promote record sales that otherwise
would not take place. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-128, at 14-15 (1995).
35 For a brief summary of the history of legislative treatment of the issue, see S.
REP. No. 104-128, at 1-4 (1995). For a discussion of policy arguments
against recognition of such a right, see Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick,
A Public Performance Right in Recordings: How to Alter the Copyright Sys-
tem Without Improving It, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152 (1974).
36 A "digital audio transmission"' is a digital transmission that embodies a sound
recording. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(5) (2000).
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SRA).3 7 The Act amended section 106 of the Copyright Act to grant the
owner of the sound recording copyright the exclusive right "to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission."38
The DPRSRA also amended section 114 of the Copyright Act to establish
appropriate limitations on and exemptions from this transmission right.3 9
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA),
which further amended sections 114 and 115 of the Act.40 The law now
grants sound recording producers the right to be compensated for public
performance of certain digital audio transmissions of their works,4 1 though
sometimes under statutory rates. 42 Potential licensees include music sub-
scription services, satellite radio, webcasters, and Internet music providers
that "make content available" 43 to individual listeners.
Digital music can be accessed in two general ways, downloading and
streaming. In downloading, a permanent and usable copy of the audio file
is transmitted and stored on the receiving machine's hard drive. After
download, the recipient can either play it back through the computer's
37 Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). For a comprehensive account of the
legislative history of the Act and a highly detailed description of its terms,
see Eric D. Leach, Everything You Always Wanted To Know About Digital
Performance Rights But Were Afraid To Ask, 48 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 191
(2000).
38 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
39 Id. §§ 114, 115. The law grants copyright owners of sound recordings the right
to authorize certain digital transmissions of their works, including interac-
tive digital audio transmissions, and to be compensated for others. The
scope of the copyright proprietor's right varies with the kind of digital trans-
mission. Most non-interactive transmissions are subject to statutory licens-
ing at rates to be negotiated or, if necessary, arbitrated. Radio stations
maintain a performance exemption for over-the-air digital broadcasts and
do not pay copyright royalties to the owner of the sound recording copy-
right. Generally, the law exempts certain types of digital performances en-
tirely so that no licenses at all are necessary; grants statutory licenses for
certain other types of digital performances so that the license fee is set by
Copyright Office proceedings rather than by private negotiations; and re-
quires licenses to be secured directly from record companies, through nego-
tiations, only for the remaining types of digital performances.
40 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). For criticism of the laboriousness
and complexity of this scheme of exemptions, statutory licenses, and volun-
tary licenses, see David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part I: On the Absurd
Complexity of the Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
189 (2000).
41 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)-(3) (2000).
42 Id. § 115.
43 Supra notes 7-8.
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sound system or "burn" (i.e., copy) it to another storage medium, such as
a recordable CD.44
Streaming technologies permit users to receive desired content and
play it with a few seconds delay. However, since no corresponding copy is
made on a hard drive, no storage occurs. If the user wants to hear the
music again, she must re-stream it from her source. Depending on
whether song choice is exercised at user or provider discretion, streaming
can be interactive45 or non-interactive. The former has the potential of
providing services commonly known as "audio-on-demand," "pay-per-lis-
ten," or "celestial jukeboxes" that are a proper component of the "making
available" right that is protected by the WIPO Treaties of 1996.46
Section 114(d) of the Copyright Act, then, establishes a carefully
graduated three-tier structure for governing transmissions through exemp-
tions, statutory licenses, and exclusive rights.4 7 Facing a technology
change that could allow music delivery without purchase of CD or tape,
Congress aimed to protect sound recording owners against commercial
displacement of sales from downloading and streaming services that pre-
served the option value of personally owned music. 48 Furthermore, non-
interactive webcasting had the additional potential of displacing the new
44 Burning equipment for CD-recordable capability now costs approximately
$150 to $200. It is reasonable to expect equipment buildout and consumer
proficiency to increase greatly in the next few years. See generally Jack Lacy
et al., Music on the Internet and the Intellectual Property Protection Prob-
lem, IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDUSTRIAL ELECTRONICS
SS77-78 (1997).
45 An "interactive" stream is "one that enables a member of the public to receive
... a transmission of a particular sound recording ... which is selected by or
on behalf of the recipient." 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) (2000). The definition
seeks to identify a service as interactive according to the amount of influ-
ence a member of the public has on the selection and performance of a
particular sound recording.
46 Supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. These services permit listeners to ob-
tain a direct, time-certain transmission of a specific recording.
47 Non-subscription digital broadcast transmissions are treated as analog radio
transmissions had been. Record producers are granted neither control nor
compensation. Subscription digital transmissions are subject to a statutory
license, provided the transmitting entity meets the eligibility conditions. Fi-
nally, the copyright owner enjoys full control over interactive transmissions
as well as subscription transmissions that do not meet the eligibility require-
ments for a statutory license.
48 H.R. REP. No. 104-274 (1995). Congress aimed to compensate sound record-
ing copyright owners for technology-driven sales displacement. Accord-
ingly, the differential treatment of kinds of users with respect to sound
recording performance liability - exemption, eligibility for compulsory li-
cense, full liability - reflects a judgment about the probable adverse effects
of each on sales of sound recordings.
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digital services that would provide downloads and streams on-demand. 49
We shall highlight the key elements of § 114(d) in so far as they relate to
the discussion that follows.
Exemptions: Under § 114(d)(1), radio stations maintain a perform-
ance exemption for over-the-air broadcasts and do not pay copyright roy-
alties to the copyright owner of the sound recording. Exemptions are now
limited to nonsubscription broadcast transmissions and, to a degree, their
retransmissions.5 0 To be exempt, the transmission must be non-interactive
and aimed at the general public rather than individual subscribers. Per-
formances of sound recordings made on simultaneous webcasts of over-
the-air broadcasts are not exempt and are governed by the terms of the
statutory licenses described immediately below.5 ' A more thorough de-
lineation of exemptions and definitions appears in the Act.52
Statutory Licenses: Under § 114(d)(2), specified non-interactive In-
ternet webcasts may be eligible for a compulsory (or statutory) license that
avoids the need for direct negotiation with the recording label. 3 Statu-
49 Amy Harmon, Congress to Preview Digital Music Service, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2001, at C1.
50 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
51 In December, 2000, the Copyright Office denied an exemption to simultane-
ous retransmissions made by over-the-air radio broadcasters. The Office
concluded that the simultaneous transmission of an over-the-air AM/FM
radio broadcast signal made by a FCC licensed broadcaster over the In-
ternet is not exempt, under § 114(d)(I)(A), from the digital performance
right. Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65
Fed. Reg. 77,292 (2000). Recognizing the greater potential for displacement
of sales, the Office noted that digital transmissions pose an "increased risk
that a listener may make a high-quality unauthorized reproduction of a
sound recording directly from the transmission instead of purchasing a legit-
imate copy in the marketplace, a risk that is clearly greater when the recipi-
ent is receiving the transmission on a computer, which can instantly
replicate and retransmit the transmission." Id. at 77,294. In response to the
Copyright Office action the National Association of Broadcasters filed suit
in federal court challenging both the Copyright Office's authority to pro-
mulgate the rule and the correctness of the ruling as a matter of statutory
construction. Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, No. 01-408 (E.D. Pa. filed
Jan. 25, 2001). The District Court rejected the broadcaster's position and
granted summary judgment to Peters, the Register of Copyrights, holding
that the Copyright Office had authority to issue its final rule and that the
Office's rule was not just reasonable but it reached the same conclusion as
the court would in the absence of its required deference to the Office after
full examination of the statute, its legislative history, and congressional in-
tent. Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
52 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2000).
53 Id. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i). An "eligible nonsubscription transmission" is a non-in-
teractive nonsubscription digital audio transmission that is not exempt and
that is part of a service that provides audio programming consisting of per-
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tory licensing may be subject to eligibility requirements54 that aim to in-
sure that the transmission does not displace sales of CDs, downloads, and
interactive music services. If copyright owners and potential users cannot
agree on a negotiated license rate, any interested party may petition the
matter to a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) for a determina-
tion of what constitutes a reasonable rate for a compulsory license for the
intended use.5 5 Reflecting economic awareness, rates and terms should
clearly reflect analogues that would have been negotiated between a will-
ing buyer and willing seller in a competitive marketplace. 56 Furthermore,
the panel must base its decision on economic, competitive and program-
ming information presented by the parties, including whether the use of
the service may substitute for or enhance the sales of phonorecords.5 7
Exclusive Rights: Under § 114(d)(3), exclusive licensing authority is
granted to the owner of the sound recording copyright (i.e., the record
label) for downloaded and interactively streamed digital audio transmis-
sions that are more likely to displace sales of physical records5 8 Protected
downloads can be permanent, temporary, or incidental 59 to a stream.
While the act grants copyright owners full rights to negotiate licenses, ex-
clusive licenses cannot be binding for more than one year until the owner
formances of sound recordings. Id. § 114(j)(6). However, licensees eligible
for a statutory license are free to negotiate alternative bilateral arrange-
ments with content owners. If a webcast is "interactive," it is not eligible for
a statutory license and therefore the webcaster must privately negotiate a
license directly with the record companies that own the copyrights to the
recordings being webcast.
54 Id. § 114(d)(2)(A), (C). Section 114(d)(2)(B) grandfathers digital uses that ex-
isted prior to the DMCA under different terms. In order to be eligible for a
statutory license, a webcast must meet a complicated set of conditions,
which include limitations on the frequency and identification of the music
performed by the service. These conditions seek to limit the license to
those transmissions seen as least likely to substitute for record sales. See
also id. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i). For example, one condition on eligibility is that
the transmitting entity not exceed the "sound recording performance com-
plement," which restricts the number of songs from a recording or by an
artist which may be played during any three-hour period. Id.
§ 114(d)(2)(B)(i), (j)(13).
55 Id. § 114(f)(2)(B).
56 Id.
57 Id. § 114(f)(2)(B)(i). The panel is also to consider "the relative roles of the
copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the copyrighted work and the
service made available to the public with respect to relative creative contri-
bution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk." Id.
§ 114(f)(2)(B)(ii).
58 Id. § 114(b), (d)(3).
59 See infra note 86.
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has granted at least five such licenses.60 This limitation recognizes the
need for markets to congeal to establish reasonable competitive
benchmarks and avoid lock-in. The limits of what constitutes an "interac-
tive service" are not wholly clear.61
Downloads: Section 115 establishes compulsory mechanical licenses
for secondary uses of musical compositions used in the traditional making
and distribution of both hard copy phonorecords and digital phonorecord
deliveries (DPDs).62 Compulsory mechanical licenses can be activated af-
ter a legitimate recording of a composition is distributed to the public.63
The law specified starting fees for units sold of permanent DPDs that were
equal to corresponding units in physical sales.64 Subsequent rates can be
set through negotiation or, if necessary, arbitration. 65
In addition to distribution of permanent downloads, § 115 also estab-
lishes a paradigm for rental, lease, or lending that could reasonably be
used to establish license fees for temporary downloads and streaming ser-
vices as well. 66 As a percentage of sales revenues, the royalty paid for
60 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(3)(A),(B) (2000).
61 The Copyright Office, rejected in the year 2000 a petition that sought a clarify-
ing amendment to the definition of "interactive" in the Office's regulations.
Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definitions of a Service, 65 Fed.
Reg. 77,330 (2000). The Office decided that "a service does not become
interactive merely because consumers may have some influence on the mu-
sic programming offered by the service." Id. at 77,332. While recognizing
that uncertainty existed over "how much influence a consumer can have on
the programming offered by a transmitting entity before that activity must
be characterized as interactive," Id., the Office concluded that it was neither
necessary, desirable, nor feasible to try to resolve the uncertainty via regula-
tion at the present time.
62 A "digital phonorecord delivery" is each individual delivery of a phonorecord
by digital transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically
identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a pho-
norecord of that sound recording. 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2000).
63 Id. § 115(a)(1).
64 For every digital phonorecord delivery made on or before December 31, 1997,
the royalty rate payable with respect to each work embodied in the pho-
norecord shall be either 6.95 cents, or 1.3 cents per minute of playing time
or fraction thereof, whichever amount is larger. Id. § 115(c)(3)(A)(i). For
deliveries made on or after January 1, 1998, the royalty rate payable with
respect to each work in the phonorecord shall equal the rate applied to
physical reproductions (i.e., "Physical Rate"). Id. § 115 (c)(3)(A)(ii).
65 Id. § 115(c)(3). As with the compulsory license for the digital performance
right, see supra note 55 and accompanying text, the rate-setting process in-
volves two steps. First, voluntary, industry-wide negotiations to set rates to
be adopted by the Copyright Office are encouraged. If these negotiations
falter, any interested party can petition the Copyright Office to convene an
arbitration proceeding to establish the fees. Id. § 115(c)(3)(B)-(F).
66 Id. § 115(c)(4).
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secondary compositions embedded in record rentals shall be equal to a
corresponding percent of revenue garnered from the sale of the pho-
norecord. If applied to "digital renting" made possible by temporary
download, § 115(c) would fix copyright fees on prices in a symmetric man-
ner and avoid distorting relative prices among competing delivery technol-
ogies. That is, if a compulsory license royalty accounts for 10% of the
revenues of a permanent download, it should also equal 10% of the reve-
nues of a corresponding temporary download.
IV. DOWNLOADS AND SUBSTITUTION
We shall now construct an economic analysis of how copyright fees
should be set for musical compositions embedded in sound recordings and
permanent DPDs.
Permanent downloading of music is an attractive alternative to own-
ing physical CDs in a number of key respects. 67 Songs can be individually
purchased, catalog choices are wider, digital technology enables instant
product delivery, and storage on hard drive takes up less space. Portabil-
ity is easier if digital files can be loaded to flash memory or virtual lockers,
and digital technology enables personalized suggestions, advertising, and
related electronic commerce. On the downside, downloads on hard drives
are not yet fully compatible with home stereo equipment and the conve-
nience of family room listening.6 8
In addition to permanent downloads, it is also possible to make trans-
mitted bits available for timed temporary storage (such as a week or
month). Access terms may vary by price, number of permitted plays, du-
ration of access, and the number of computers on which the work may be
played. The resulting business model will enable record companies to dis-
tinguish different intensities of use and price accordingly.
Digital music will then be made available along a continuum of lis-
tener intensities that will further confound attempts to classify transmis-
sions as reproductions or performances. 6 9  While downloaded
reproductions may generally be expected to displace or promote original
sales of CDs and tapes, it is important to take seriously a large scale substi-
tution effect, as it may subvert the incentives of copyright. This assess-
67 Michael Einhorn, Music Licensing in the Digital Age, in COPYRIGHT IN THE
CULTURAL INDUSTRIEs (Ruth Towse ed., 2002).
68 This disadvantage will lessen if the industry can establish standards to accom-
modate CD burning, see supra note 44 and accompanying text, and users
build out wireless local area networks that interconnect home entertain-
ment appliances.
69 See supra notes 5-6.
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ment of effect would properly consider the displacement of both record
sales and licensing opportunities for the copyright holder.70
In judging the potential for sales displacement and its implications,
policy makers must attend to the risk of distorting relative prices of two
music products that are substitutes for one another. Consider CDs and
permanent downloads. A percent charge of X is placed on the first and a
higher charge of Y on the second. The higher charge on downloads cre-
ates an incentive to substitute to the other.7 1 This shift to a less preferred
choice is economically inefficient.7 2 If retail sales and DPDs are substi-
tutes for one another, it would be economically efficient to fix equal per-
cent charges on both in order to avoid price distortion.
As a business matter, music publishers who exclusively control first-
time mechanical rights for a composition can be expected to hold for some
reasonable balance on relative prices. More practically, they might assess
equal unit charges on sold tracks in CDs and digital downloads. By impos-
ing equal unit charges, they would recognize that a digital download may
displace the sale of the same songs and endeavor to "make whole" the
publisher and writer regardless of which is chosen. Though not theoreti-
70 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 928 (2d Cir.
1995). Certain reproductions or performances may displace or promote
original sales. That is, they may have substitution and/or complementary
effects. For example, a permanent download of tracks on a CD may dis-
place the sale of the original record. By contrast, a sound recording per-
formance in a record store may promote the sale of originals, and that
performance is now exempt from copyright liability. 17 U.S.C. § 110(7)
(2000). Because of the presence of both these kinds of effects, as an a priori
matter it is difficult to predict sometimes whether a practice of reproduction
or performance increases or decreases sales. See Lewis Kurlantzick & Jac-
queline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Forma-
tion of Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYR. Soc'y 497, 501-15 (1998). However,
as a matter of copyright policy, a large-scale net substitution effect would
have to be taken seriously, as it implies that the practice(s) may subvert the
incentives of copyright to the point where less works than socially desirable
are being produced and marketed.
71 The result is that everyone who values the second good at more than X but less
than Y will not purchase one, an inefficient outcome. See, e.g., A. MITCH-
ELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS 119-20 (2d. ed.
1989). See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC Fi-
NANCE 142-47 (1959). Some consumers are deterred by the higher price of
the product because of the charge from buying the product at all. As a
result, some resources that would have produced the second good are now
directed to other goods. But these goods are less valuable in the opinion of
consumers. The consumers substitute a product that must be inferior, else
they would have made the substitution before the charge was imposed.
72 Accordingly, efficiency concerns dictate that copyright fees reflect the value of
process neutrality and be designed to minimize substitution effects.
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cally perfect,7 3 the practice would preserve a reasonably efficient relation-
ship between relative prices and is fairly well justified.
For second reproductions, where compulsory licenses can be utilized,
composition rights for physical sales and permanent DPDs are now set at
the same unit price. 74 As noted, the rights owners are made whole regard-
less of which option is chosen. As explained above, compulsory licenses
for temporary downloads might be set at the same percentage of impli-
cated sales revenues as for permanent.75 This arrangement would more
directly establish a price symmetry for temporary and permanent mechan-
ical rights.
If the fees for the related reproduction rights of mechanical imprints
and permanent downloads of music compositions are added in a balanced
fashion, it would be economically inefficient to fix on DPDs additional
copyright fees not assessed on retail sales. Nonetheless, this possibility
exists, as a current contested question is whether permanent or temporary
downloads constitute both a reproduction and a public performance, even
if the recipient is unable to hear the song as the file is received. Pointing
to the Copyright Act's definitions of "perform" and "publicly," 76 perform-
73 Relative price ratios can be distorted a bit if unit charges are set equal to one
another.
74 That price is the larger of 8 cents per song or 1.55 cents per recording minute.
37 C.F.R. § 255.3(k) (2002) (royalty payable under compulsory license for
making and distributing phonorecords); 37 C.F.R. § 255.5(b) (2002) (royalty
rate for digital phonorecord deliveries). 37 C.F.R. § 255.7 (2002) (future
proceedings).
Presumably, the Copyright Office action in establishing identical compulsory fees
for imprints of musical compositions recorded in both media involves a rec-
ognition that digital downloads may displace the sales of the same songs
imprinted on original CDs. As digital phonorecord deliveries are the func-
tional equivalent of a reproduction and distribution of both the sound re-
cording and the embodied musical composition, transmitters of
transmissions which are deemed to be such deliveries must satisfy the com-
pulsory licensing requirements for the delivery of the musical work as well
as obtain a voluntary license for the delivery of the sound recording. In-
deed, since copyright owners have the same protection against infringement
via digital phonorecord delivery as they have against physical phonorecord
distributions, an unauthorized digital phonorecord delivery implicates the
reproduction/distribution rights of both the sound recording and musical
work copyright owners and potentially implicates the public performance
right of the musical work copyright owner and the digital performance right
of the sound recording copyright owner.
75 See supra note 66 and accompanying text..
76 Supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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ance rights advocates assert that all digital transmissions of music are pub-
lic performances and therefore subject to copyright liability as such.77
If this position is accepted, the digital transmitter would need sepa-
rate licenses for two complementary rights. Moreover, it would need to
negotiate with the publisher for the mechanical component, and the three
performing rights organizations-American Society for Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and SE-
SAC-for the coincident performance right.78 By imposing additional
costs of negotiation and administration, "double dipping" through the per-
formance right here would present an economically inefficient burden on
providers of digital phonorecords. 79
In August 2001, the Copyright Office considered the matter in a re-
port issued in connection with its responsibilities under section 104 of the
DMCA.80 It urged that DPDs be exempt from the performance right:
77 See, e.g., ASCAP, Frequently Asked Questions About Internet Licensing, at
http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/webfaq.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2001)
("every Internet transmission of a musical work constitutes a public per-
formance of that work"). The basic copyright question with respect to
download transmissions is whether these transmissions constitute not only a
reproduction of the transmitted music but also a public performance by dig-
ital transmission, even if the recipient is unable to hear the song as the digi-
tal music file is being received. If so, the transmitter also requires
permission from the owners of the public performance rights. Interestingly,
the Clinton Administration's White Paper, which is quite generous to copy-
right owners in its interpretation of copyright law in the Internet setting,
concludes that such a transmission clearly does not constitute a public per-
formance. R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions:
Existing Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV.
237, 258-60 (2000).
78 Virtually all music publishers and professional singwriters are members or are
affiliated with a performance right society. These collective organizations
function to enforce the exclusive right of the copyright owner of a musical
work publicly to perform that work. The societies sell licenses, collect fees,
monitor unauthorized users to discover copyright violations, bring infringe-
ment actions when unlicensed use is discovered, take samples to determine
the relative frequency with which various compositions are used, and, after
deducting operating expenses, distribute revenues to composers and music
publishers and their heirs and successors.
79 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
80 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (2001). Section 104 of
the DMCA directed the Register of Copyrights and the Assistant Secretary
for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce to
jointly evaluate: "(1) the effects of the amendments made by this title and
the development of electronic commerce and associated technology on the
operation of sections 109 and 117 of title 17, United States Code; and (2)
the relationship between existing and emergent technology and the opera-
tions of sections 109 and 117 of title 17, United States Code." Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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To the extent that such a download can be considered a public
performance, the performance is merely a technical by-product
of the transmission process that has no value separate from the
value of the download . . .. Demanding a separate payment for
the copies that are an inevitable by-product of that activity ap-
pears to be double-dipping and is not a sound equitable basis for
resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine.8 1
The Report's suggested solution, which places copyright charges for
DPDs under the exclusive domain of mechanical rights,82 can be expected
to produce a reasonably balanced outcome and is therefore economically
sound.
V. INTERACTIVE STREAMING
Interactive streaming enables digital users to choose music tracks in
"jukebox" play that involves personal choice. In combining choice with
transmission, interactive streaming preserves the option value of owned
discs without need for storage in cabinets or hard drives. Furthermore,
interactive streaming widens subscriber choice to access entire catalogs of
music at a moment's notice and to identify preferred tracks that can subse-
quently be downloaded. The relative market value of streaming will in-
crease yet more as music transmission goes wireless and users enjoy
81 Id. at 146-48, xxvii-xxviii.
82 This exemption from the performance right is justified because separate ad-
ministration and double-dipping remain a problem when the end user seeks
to secure a copy rather than a real time performance, as the delivery of the
copy could be considered a public performance as well as a digital distribu-
tion of the copy. Accordingly, the reproduction right is the only one that
should be paid for. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies:
Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1245, 1363 (2001) (incidental copies made in routers across the In-
ternet do not pose disincentive threat nor do copies made in computer's
RAM); Lemley, supra note 1, at 579 (little case support for applying two
different exclusive rights to same act and no policy reason to do so). See
also Jaap H. Spoor, The Copyright Approach to Copying on the Internet:
(Over) Stretching the Reproduction Right?, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT
IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 67, 70 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996) (unwel-
come implications of treating copies in RAM memory as reproductions);
Letter from Keith Aoki et al. to The Honorable Howard Coble, Chair, Sub-
committee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on Judiciary 3-5
(Oct. 2001) (on file with author) (Copyright Office recommendation wel-
come but does not go far enough in reassessing treatment of temporary,
incidental digital versions). But see generally ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE
C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 587-88 (6th ed. 2002) (Copyright Office analysis
presently persuasive, but questionable whether we will always be able to tell
when economically significant act is reproduction as opposed to public per-
formance or vice versa.).
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greater portability. Finally, streaming may better serve the interests of
rights owners as well, as users cannot readily pirate temporary reproduc-
tions made during the course of a stream.
Any service made available by interactive streaming may at times dis-
place or promote individual downloads and retail sales.83 Nonetheless,
the displacement threat of streaming seems substantial and will be taken
as primary. Having exclusive performance rights,84 a label may control
interactive streaming of its tracks and price access as it sees fit. Therefore,
a label can price the "making available" of retail sales, downloads, and
interactive streams in a manner that internalizes all economic tradeoffs.8 5
However, the technical process of streaming requires that the receiv-
ing device temporarily store as an incidental reproduction a few seconds of
transmitted data in a segment of random access memory (RAM) that is
allocated as a "buffer" for audio performance.8 6 A conflict, consequently,
arises regarding the proper legal handling of the buffer reproduction that
is made necessary to hold the bits that are part of a streamed transmis-
sion.8 7 The mechanical rights organizations assert that all Internet trans-
83 Digital technology permits audiophiles to instantly access music from signed
and unsigned artists without needing to visit local record stores. Thus, while
interactive streaming may offer subscribers access to entire catalogues in a
manner that could displace needs for permanent ownership, it also may pro-
vide free streams to promote live events and product made available by the
same artist.
84 As established in sections 106 and 114 of the Copyright Act, sound recordings
used in interactive streaming are protected by an exclusive public perform-
ance right.
85 Thus, the danger of unbalanced copyright fees is avoided for sound recordings
used in interactive streamings, as record companies will have reason to
avoid distorting relative prices and to internalize all economic tradeoffs in-
volving the related prices of substitute services.
86 The receiving device collects in the RAM buffer a few seconds of data to guard
against interruptions or delays due to line congestion or slow Internet con-
nections. More particularly, when a user requests transmission of streamed
transmissions, the software on the user's receiving device communicates
with the transmitting server and determines, given the quality of the media
and the speed of the transmission, how many seconds of data should be
stored in the receiving device's RAM buffer before beginning playback to
the user. The data in the RAM buffer cannot be accessed for other pur-
poses within the receiving device. Once performed, the transmitted data
leave the buffer permanently and cannot otherwise be stored in a digital
copy on the device. The buffer has no utility to the consumer other than to
facilitate these performances. As no copy of the recording remains stored
on the computer, if the user wants to hear the streamed recording again, he
must once more contact the Web site and request that it transmit the file
again.
87 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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missions involve physical reproduction in random access memory,
however temporary, and therefore implicate reproduction rights.8 8
The Copyright Office's Section 104 Report, however, argues that the
temporary buffer copy of a licensed digital transmission should be non-
infringing 89 and recommends that Congress enact legislation to establish
an explicit exemption.90
Buffer copies have no independent economic significance. They
are made solely to enable the performance. . . . The same copy-
right owners [i.e., publishers and songwriters] appear to be seek-
ing a second compensation for the same activity merely because
of the happenstance that the transmission technology implicates
the reproduction right, and the reproduction right of songwriters
and music publishers is administered by a different collective
than the public performance right.91
The Copyright Office's recommendations mirror provisions in a re-
cent European Union (EU) Directive, which exempts transient copies
from the reach of the reproduction right.92
If enacted, the report would put the "making available" right under
two different administrative regimes. Interactive streaming would be
under the domain of the performance right, and downloading under the
domain of the mechanical. There would be little possibility of coordinat-
ing disparate rights under split administrations.
From an economic perspective, this compromise, though superior to a
regime of double-dipping, is inefficient. Much as with temporary
downloads, the Copyright Office should assign streaming rights in a man-
88 See, e.g., Joint Reply Comments on Copyright Industry Organizations, Report
to Congress Pursuant to Section 104 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act 8-13 (Sept. 5, 2000).
89 The Office believes that there is a strong case that the making of a buffer copy
in the course of audio streaming - a copy made solely to enable perform-
ance of the musical work and sound recording - is a fair use. Recognizing
the uncertainty attending application of the case-by-case fair use defense,
however, the Office recommends that Congress enact legislation amending
the Copyright Act to preclude any reproduction right liability with respect
to temporary buffer copies that are incidental to a licensed digital transmis-
sion of a public performance of a sound recording and any underlying musi-
cal work.
90 DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 80, at xxiii-xxvii, 132-46.
91 Id. at 143.
92 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information society, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10, par. 33, art. 5(1). See
also id. art. 5(2)(d) (preservation of ephemeral recordings made by broad-
casters permitted). Member States must implement the Directive in their
national laws by December 22, 2002. Id. art. 13(1).
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ner that is likely to avoid distorting relative prices among subscribers. Ef-
ficiency in relative pricing and regulatory administration can be more
reasonably expected if all of the "making available" transmissions were
integrated under the same domain. Moreover, additional savings in nego-
tiation would result as digital providers negotiate for mechanical rights in
"one stop negotiations" that avoid a second round for performance
licenses.
As a final competitive advantage of this proposed structure, mechani-
cal royalties are now paid to individual publishers, who pass to.respective
writers shares that can be bilaterally negotiated. When publishers and
writers so negotiate, individual publishers can commit to more specific
contract terms and generally compete for writers. Among the desirable
features of publisher negotiations, advances may share risk more equita-
bly. Detailed contract negotiation is less practical in performing rights,
where agencies must administer contracts for millions of songs. Indeed,
performing rights societies now generally split royalties 50/50 between
publisher and writer. Accordingly, by routing payments through publish-
ers, writers may have greater capacity to negotiate individualized contracts
with their particular publisher
VI. NON-INTERACTIVE STREAMING
We now turn to the remaining major digital transmission technology,
non-interactive streaming uses that are eligible for a compulsory sound
recording license.93 "Webcasting" provides "broadcast-like" services that
will greatly expand delivery of music to new audiences, regions and coun-
tries. Though it is uncertain what business models will prove most viable,
advertising revenues, e-commerce, and the sales of market data can be
expected to figure prominently.
As an equitable matter, songwriters are appropriately compensated
for performance rights on broadcast radio and television as their music
provides the incentive for people to listen and advertisers to spend money
to reach them. The collection amount is now proportional to the sales of
advertising. For example, blanket fees for radio broadcast uses at ASCAP
are set at 1.615% of station advertising revenues less reasonable
deductions. 94
Webcasters then can reasonably pay a percentage of their earned rev-
enues for performance rights. The revenue base for license fees should
93 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2000). Eligible licensees may, instead of utilizing the
compulsory license, choose to negotiate other alternative arrangements
with individual content owners.
94 ASCAP, Local Station Blanket Radio License, at 8(A)(2), available at http://
www.ascap.com/licensing/radio/BlanketRadioLicense.pdf (last visited
Mar. 3, 2002).
437Traffic Jam on the Music Highway
Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
include advertising revenues, as well as other commercial services not di-
rectly related to the sale of music. The appropriate percentage amount
would depend on usage and the likelihood that some users of non-interac-
tive streaming will utilize software to capture preferred streams for perma-
nent download, thereby displacing sales, or otherwise invest listening time
that might otherwise be used with subscription services.
More openness could be had if collections for performance rights
were removed from the jurisdiction of the Federal Rate Courts and reas-
signed to the Copyright Office, with license fees determined at Copyright
Office Hearings. Under its present governance structure, the Copyright
Office can issue Notices of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking that would
invite comments from all affected parties with regard to any relevant mat-
ter. Furthermore, the Copyright Office could grant equal legal standing to
any party in administrative hearings designed to consider rule changes and
set license fees. This change would particularly address the legal concerns
of copyright owners (publishers and writers), who now lack legal standing
on some issues in the Rate Courts.95
As is discussed more thoroughly elsewhere, there is no economic
need for more than one collection agency to administer the performing
right for musical compositions. 96 Consequently, an appointed agent for
digital collections must be designated in some manner, including possibly a
consortium operated by or rotated between the three existing performing
rights organizations, ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC. Digital technologies now
exist for the monitoring of Webcast performances that could enable
stream counts and surveillance. Such monitoring could be done by an ap-
pointed performing rights society or an independent party, such as Sound
Exchange9 7 or Music Reports98 which would report results back to the
95 Consent Decrees must be interpreted within their plain meaning, are not mod-
ifiable by the Court, and are adjusted only with the bilateral consent of the
signing parties. See United States v. Atl. Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19 (1959);
Suarez v. Ward, 896 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556
(2d Cir. 1985). Licensee standing was denied in United States v. Am. Soc'y
of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 208 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
Tffd, 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers,
Authors & Publishers, 708 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Writer standing
was denied in United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publish-
ers, 708 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Am. Soc'y of Compos-
ers, Authors & Publishers, 739 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v.
Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 914 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
96 See generally Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Perform-
ance Rights in Broadcasting, COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming
2002). Except for Brazil, there is no other country that has more than one
performing rights organization.
97 Sound Exchange is the monitoring authority of the recording labels.
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collection agency. With monitored reports, the collection agent would ap-
portion the collected performance royalties to individual rights owners in
an agreed manner that may consider both the number of streams and lis-
teners of a particular composition.
VII. CONCLUSION
We summarize our discussion as follows. We advocate a two-tier
structure for the administration of copyright in digital audio transmissions
of musical compositions. First, composers and publishers of songs would
be compensated for permanent and incidental uses related to the repro-
duction of their works in downloads and interactive streaming services.
Rates would be designed to ensure a rough percentage parity among the
services. Such symmetrical benchmarks, now in effect in § 115 regarding
rates for rental of phonorecords, would be instituted for temporary
downloads.
Performance licenses would remain in effect as a means for garnering
revenues from advertising and other services unrelated to the direct sale of
music. Performance licenses can be applied to webcasters, as well as inter-
active services that supplement their music provision with other services.
These licenses are appropriately administered by the Copyright Office,
with fees collected by one appointed agent, and monitored with a digital
system that assigns to each party a designated share of the collected pot of
royalties.
98 Music Reports, Inc. is an independent monitoring authority that now collects
music use data on broadcast radio and television.
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